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This paper reports on research into the effectiveness of strategic commanders and their
multi-agency teams in response to major incidents. It is argued that current models of
crisis leadership fail to establish a balance between the requirement for task skills,
interpersonal skills, stakeholder awareness and personal qualities of commanders and
their teams. The paper sets out a theoretical model for interwoven leadership combining
these features.
1. Introduction
T he crisis management literature, typically, focuseson a taxonomy, definitions, communications and
analyses of crises. In contrast, there are far fewer
contributions to this debate from scholars researching
incident command and leadership, despite this being
identified as one of the most critical factors affecting
crisis response (Flin & Arbuthnot, 2002).
A number of contextual factors may contribute to
this research deficit. These include inconsistent defini-
tions of the key components of effective crisis team
leadership; the huge spectrum of stakeholders involved
in a crisis, each of which may focus on different aspects
of effectiveness according to their own agendas; the
variable nature of crises; the many factors that can
affect crisis leadership for good or ill; the interaction
between leaders and teams who may not work to-
gether regularly; the varying effect of stress and stres-
sors on leaders; and the effect of organizational culture
on leaders and their decision making. The changing
contexts and causes of crises make it very difficult to
elicit a consistent theory of effective leadership (Mitroff,
Pearson, & Harrington, 1996; Pearson & Clair, 1998).
The diversity of competing challenges is significant,
as leaders must balance public safety and showing
compassion to those caught up in the crisis with other
concerns. These concerns include freedom of move-
ment, and over commitment of resources and prior-
itization under the glare of media scrutiny and political
pressure from all sides (Boin & ’t Hart, 2003; Boin,
2005; Drennan & McConnell, 2007). The concepts of
‘leadership’ and ‘leadership skills’ are not well defined
(Slaven & Flin, 1997); therefore, identifying what makes
for effective crisis leadership is somewhat problematic.
There is also a wide spectrum of effectiveness criteria
frequently applied by stakeholders in a crisis (Pearson &
Clair, 1998) even though it is acknowledged by scholars
that each crisis is potentially unique (Turner, 1978;
Yusko & Goldstein, 1997; Sniezek, Wilkins, Wadlington,
& Baumann, 2002; Schoenberg, 2005). There is a lack of
research both into the relationship between incident/
emergency command abilities and personality (Flin &
Slaven, 1996) and into the selection and training of crisis
team leaders (Borodzicz, 2004). In the United Kingdom
emergency services, competence requirements for key
decision makers are still likely to be based on rank
rather than proven skill, expertise and ability (LaPorte
& Consolini, 1991; Pearce & Fortune, 1995; Borodzicz,
2004). However, it is argued that personal character-
istics may also contribute to the effectiveness of a
leader, whether at normality or during the height of
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an incident. These include self-awareness, emotional
stability, self-confidence and even the willingness to take
on a leadership role at all (Flin, 1996). There is also a
‘locus of control’ factor (the extent to which an
individual perceives that they have control over a given
situation), and a capacity to discuss and question
aspects of crisis openly and without defensiveness
(Travers, 1998).
Effectiveness must also be examined in the context of
the various stages of a crisis, and it depends pivotally on
the effectiveness of the person leading that crisis (Yusko
& Goldstein, 1997). Crisis management teams and
leaders need to be selected to cope with the demands
of tasks within crises (Smith, 2000), but leading in a
crisis also entails addressing people, task and environ-
ment issues (Boin & Lagadec, 2000). Crisis leadership
must be effective amid organizational chaos, pressure
from the media, stress, inaccurate information (Boin &
’t Hart, 2003) and the diverse demands from stake-
holders. The human consequences of ineffective com-
mand in an emergency can range from minor injury to
significant loss of life (Slaven & Flin, 1997; Flin &
Arbuthnot, 2002) as well as damage to property,
economic and social implications. It is, therefore,
important to understand that the handling of the
incident will play out at a political level (Boin & ’t
Hart, 2003; Boin, 2005) where crisis can be seen as
publicly visible failure (Borins, 2002). It can be seen that
operational handling of the physical incident itself is not
the only yardstick of effective leadership.
Although the outcomes of an effective team generally
exceed the sum of the isolated individual contributions
of its members, (Pearson & Clair, 1998), many team
characteristics will be affected, positively or negatively,
by the leader’s attitudes, behaviours and competencies
(Crichton, Lauche, & Flin, 2005). The team members’
agendas must also be considered (Bland, 1998), parti-
cularly to encourage the cohesiveness so important in
the team (Smith, 2000). Hence, it is important to
understand that both the team members and the leader
are in a dynamic state of mutual construction that
contributes significantly to a positive outcome.
Any multi-agency event will be demanding, and effec-
tiveness will typically rely on successful integration of
the team members (Auf Der Heide, 1989; ’t Hart &
Rosenthal et al., 1993; Paton & Flin, 1999) requiring, inter
alia, strong leadership and team optimization skills.
However, power, authority and responsibility rarely
accrue to one person, and the support of others would
be needed even if the decision maker could make a
choice unilaterally (Taylor, 1984; Pearson & Clair, 1998;
Borodzicz & Van Haperen, 2002; Flin, 1996; Smith, 2000).
By definition, no leader operates without a team for him
or her to lead, and trust is a key factor (Burke, 1997).
Culture impacts on crises at all stages, from planning
for them (Penrose, 1999; King, 2002) through managing
them, and thence returning to normality. Approaches in
crisis handling are likely to differ between the action-
oriented blue light services and consensus-seeking
public services such as local government and health
services, and this may cause tension. There can be
reinforced silos of hierarchy and structure that not only
hinder communication intra- and inter-organizationally,
but constrict interdisciplinary thinking, sharing and
trans-departmental thinking (Carrel, 2000). The will-
ingness of civil servants to experiment with new ideas
and policies may be constrained by their organizational
context and culture, with the potential to lead to
groupthink (’t Hart, 1994).
The hierarchy of an organization can influence the
degree of autonomy that any incident manager has
(Penrose, 1999), the level of their authority and re-
sponsibility (Flin, 1996; Boin & ’t Hart, 2003) and their
confidence and ability to step outside standard operat-
ing procedures (Borodzicz, 2000) as following these
blindly may be counter-productive (Turner, 1978;
Turner, 1994; Skriver, Flin, & Robert Gordon, 1996;
Lagadec, 1997; Borodzicz, 2000; Borodzicz, 2004;
Crichton et al., 2005). If leaders are constrained by
fears of breaching organizational taboos – cross-
functional, technical, hierarchical or cultural – for fear
of future sanctions, their effectiveness and usefulness to
the crisis management team and the organization may
be compromised (Robert & Lajtha, 2002). In organiza-
tions with a perceived blame culture, risk aversion is
likely to be high and there is a tendency to counter this
by becoming extra conservative in responding to the
crisis – this has been called ‘threat rigidity’ (Weisaeth,
Knudsen, & Tonnessen, 2002; Grant & Mack, 2004;
James & Wooten, 2005). Conservatism could be coun-
tered by the concept of a ‘court fool’ or a devil’s
advocate to set out opposing views (Carrel, 2000),
although this would require champions at a very senior
level in an organization to embed and encourage
divergent opinions, especially within the risk-averse
public services.
It is less easy in the field of crisis response leadership
to identify those who break the rules and win over
difficult odds to achieve their desired outcome, as there
tends to be more focus on command failure. It is the
failures that are most under scrutiny in the event of
a subsequent enquiry (Flin, 1996). However, where a
crisis event has been successfully managed, often this
can be directly linked to creative or flexible rule-
breaking (Borodzicz, 2004).
2. Emergency management in the
United Kingdom
The emergency management system in the United
Kingdom is historically predicated on a local response,
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mirroring the reluctance of the central government to
interfere in matters of a local nature. This autonomy is
reinforced by the existence of an elected local govern-
ment, although there is also a wide gamut of non-
elected organizations to facilitate planning coherence
and response to major incidents.
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 divides responders
into two main categories. Category 1 responders have
a legal obligation to prepare plans for addressing risk
and dealing with a wide range of civil emergencies. The
police service, fire and rescue authorities, NHS ambu-
lance trusts, Primary Care Trusts, local government, the
Environment Agency and the Health Protection Agency
come under this category. Category 2 responders are
required to cooperate with and provide information to
Category 1 responders, and include electricity and gas
suppliers, water and sewerage suppliers and telecom-
munication providers (HMSO, 2004).
The wide cross section of cultural approaches to
situation analysis and decision making is evident. ‘In
most large scale crisis situations, there may be some
centralisation via crisis centres, but the majority of
important decisions result from the process of bringing
together many key participants in which consultation,
negotiation and outright confrontation are the orders
of the day’ (’t Hart & Rosenthal et al., 1993).
Invocation of the emergency structure will trigger
one or more of three ascending levels of response and
recovery, known as Bronze, Silver and Gold, which
respond at the operational, tactical and strategic levels.
At the strategic level, the multi-agency group that brings
together the gold commanders from the relevant
organizations is known as the Strategic Co-ordinating
Group (SCG), usually chaired by a senior police officer
of Assistant Chief Constable rank or above. He or she
is referred to as the Gold Co-ordinator, to reinforce
the co-ordination role as opposed to a command and
control approach. The SCG will be situated away from
the main incident, and will take a longer term, high-level
holistic view of response and recovery, horizon scan-
ning for developments and anticipating demand on
resources and manpower and highlighting its strategy
to the Silver level below it for implementation.
3. Research approach
This paper puts forward initial findings from continuing
research conducted on effective multi-agency leader-
ship at the strategic level in response to major incidents
in the United Kingdom. The words ‘Gold’ and ‘Strate-
gic’ will be used interchangeably to refer to the level of
emergency response being studied.
Unstructured interviews based on guided conversa-
tions (Yin, 2003) were undertaken with senior officers
and officials in key agencies who contribute at a
strategic level in a crisis, both as leaders of, and
participants in, strategic-level teams. Their perspective
on what constitutes effectiveness in a strategic multi-
agency crisis leader was based on their personal
experience. Respondents identified positive or negative
factors impacting on effectiveness as well as how they
viewed the roles of other participating agencies in the
strategic team, and what training should be undertaken.
This approach was chosen because of the difficulties
in conducting research in this area. Naturalistic re-
search – that is, rooted in the natural setting of what is
being described (McNeill, 1990) – on crisis is proble-
matic, due to the context and ethical issues surrounding
the way crises take place. Experimenting on live sub-
jects is not an option for obvious ethical reasons, not
only because of the potential huge cost of such an
approach, but even more crucially, because of the
impact on human lives (Robert & Lajtha, 2002). True
crises are still relatively rare, and cannot be reproduced
because each one is unique, and thus cannot be
replicated in an experiment. Using a methodology
such as the critical incident technique (Flanaghan,
1954) – where an individual is debriefed after the
occurrence of the crisis in order to discover behaviours
around critical elements of the job – can be flawed with
the wisdom of hindsight. Data analysis of archive
material will also depend on the perspective of the
person(s) collecting it. Post-incident analysis is invari-
ably conducted through the lens of criticism and
‘lessons learnt’.
Equally, a simulated crisis cannot be tested in reality
(Robert & Lajtha, 2002). Thus, researchers are reduced
to using simulations to gain their insights, as this
method is often the only feasible way to analyse a
person’s ability in a crisis situation (Kleiboer, 1997).
However, simulations too have their drawbacks, where
performance may be linked with conformance, and may
be more concerned with a player’s ability to conform to
a particular training culture than about dealing with a
real crisis (Borodzicz, 2004).
4. Preliminary findings compared with
current literature
The factors associated with effective leadership are
already well researched in the academic literature. A
few examples from the many available take account of
managerial effectiveness including personality traits,
skills, knowledge and self-image (Boyatzis, 1982); under-
standing the self, including goals, intentions, responses
and behaviour, as well as understanding others and their
feelings (Goleman, 1996); understanding complex inter-
dependencies and the implications of efforts to make
changes require cognitive skills and systems thinking
210 Katherine R. Devitt and Edward P. Borodzicz
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 16 Number 4 December 2008
& 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation & 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
(Senge, 1990); and values and evidence-based leader-
ship (Kouzes & Posner, 2007).
There are several elements that could potentially
have a significant bearing on crisis leader effectiveness.
Experience, skills, behaviours, commitment, training,
and values of the Gold Co-ordinator and their team
are key factors. However, the diverse cultures and
decision-making approaches that are likely to exist in
the Gold team, the frequency with which this team
meets to practice its response skills and the presence
or absence of team member continuity must colour
effectiveness. The wide variety of stakeholder expecta-
tions arising from a spectrum of major incidents also
has a bearing.
It has been argued that the test of a good crisis leader
is his or her ability to focus on solvable problems; to
prioritize the elements of a problem in terms of how
much progress can be achieved with each element in a
very small amount of time; to delegate responsibility
effectively; to manage the ‘span of control’, or number
of pressing tasks; to communicate clearly and rationally;
and to keep a level head in a crisis (Alexander, 2004).
However, this approach appears to focus more on
analytical and logical competences than on people skills.
Command skills identified from military and emergency
services (Slaven & Flin, 1997; Crichton et al., 2005)
would also suggest situation assessment, generic deci-
sion-making, prioritizing, monitoring and planning.
Researchers have also recognized the significance of
human management competences such as team co-
ordination, leadership and stress management. It is no
longer just about handling the technical side of a crisis,
but also recognizing important qualitative contributions
(Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Borodzicz & Van Haperen,
2002). As in other areas of leadership, there is an
increasing appreciation that people management com-
petences are as essential as task competencies, and that
both competency sets need to be included in assessing,
training and evaluating effective crisis managers. Non-
technical skills are as important as technical expertise
and knowledge and application of emergency operating
procedures (Crichton & Flin, 2001). Crichton et al.
(2005) put forward a helpful list of command beha-
viours highlighting both people and task aspects for
strategic- and tactical-level incident management team
members.
Category Element Behaviours
Situation
assessment
Information gathering
Shared awareness
Projection/prediction
Expectations
Obtain summary of current situation from others
Shares view of current situation with others
Discusses contingencies and identifies potential future problems
Articulates expectations i.e. goals and potential event evolution
Decision-
making
Problem definition and diagnosis
Option generation
Risk and time assessment
Response selection (analytical/
rule-based strategy use)
Outcome review
Gathers information and diagnoses problem
Recalls previous similar experiences; considers alternative
courses of action
Identifies the risks and discusses alternative courses of action:
considers time available in which to select course of action
Identifies options and selects courses of action
Checks outcome against expectations
Teamwork Team and workload management
Coordination of activities
Consideration and support
Distributes tasks appropriately among team members and
detects gaps and inconsistencies
Ensures that all team members are engaged in the task and are
participating to achieve the goal
Acknowledges other team members tasks
Leadership Command
Planning and replanning
Provide direction
Delegation
Communication
Communication with others
Takes charge of situation if required, identifies in tensions and
goals; establishes and implements incident management team
structure (if required)
Participates in planning and encourages task completion;
modifies plans if required in response to situation
Determines key goals and prioritise these tasks and activities
Checks the tasks are being appropriately undertaken
Briefing/debriefing
Conducts briefings/debriefing to share information
Uses clear and open communication with others
From Crichton et al. (2005).
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Although these command skills might be acknowl-
edged by the vast majority of Gold leaders, it is
suggested that there are some significant omissions.
There is no mention of personal resilience to stress,
or of an ethical dimension, or of the moral courage
required to make a difficult command decision. It takes
no account of the cultural and political dimension in
which a crisis leader may have to operate. One senior
police officer who took part in the research interviews
gave an example of the need to adapt to community
sensibilities after the co-ordinated bomb blasts that
were perpetrated by Islamic extremists in London in
July 2005. The UK Police Service put out messages of
reassurance that there were armed officers on the
streets for people’s protection. This had a negative
impact on the Muslim community who saw this as
threatening. The Police Service learned about this
perception from their Independent Advisory Commit-
tees, which included representatives from the Muslim
community. When the next threat took place, the
Police revised their messages to reinforce that their
officers were on the street to protect all the commu-
nities, and would give support to those communities
wherever they could. For a military example, one need
only look to some of the delicate negotiations that take
place between the British Army and local tribes-people
in Afghanistan, often in the middle of challenging
incident handling.
Crisis leaders need to be able to put themselves in
the position of all stakeholders, including the victims,
and be able to recognize their diverse needs and
feelings. They need to anticipate and manage the stress
experienced by others, while also dealing with the
stress they themselves are experiencing (Travers,
1998). A leader under severe stress will neither
be able to make the effective analysis and decisions
required, nor be in a position to support others, if he
or she has not attended to their own psychological
welfare.
Leaders managing crises under stressful situations
are likely to revert to the style with which they are
most comfortable – an unconscious preference perhaps
– and the more disturbing the situation, the stronger
the urge to take refuge in familiar procedures (Lagadec,
1997). Thus, those incident managers and commanders
who place more value on their people management
skills may well focus their attention on their team,
stakeholders and operational partners. Those who
value their logical and analytical skills may pay more
attention to problem analysis, prioritized decision-
making and solution delivery. ‘Leaders who are more
task-oriented than human-relations oriented reach the
point where they neglect human relations altogether
(and vice versa)’ (Lagadec, 1993). It is clear that it is the
successful combination of the two stances that is likely
to deliver the most effective outcome, but it is worth
noting that personal preferences and organizational
culture will play a large part. Other personal character-
istics will also contribute to the makeup of a leader,
whether at normality or during the height of an
incident, such as self-awareness, emotional stability,
self-confidence and the willingness to take on a leader-
ship role at all (Flin, 1996).
At all levels of crisis handling, and particularly where
the crisis is hallmarked by inter-agency response, re-
lationships with stakeholders and operational partners
have to be given careful consideration, not just in the
planning stages, but during the incident and after in the
recovery stage.
Although there are many common components that
consistently emerge and that may be applicable to crisis
response leaders, there are some difficulties in trans-
ferring leadership qualities, abilities and competences
in wholesale fashion. The person who was impressive
in one crisis may collapse in another (Wolfe, 1991;
Lagadec, 1993; Flin, 1996) and effective crisis manage-
ment behaviours will vary from incident to incident
(Yusko & Goldstein, 1997). A crisis will be managed
differently because of the many situational factors that
pertain, including the context of the event (e.g., busi-
ness or industrial incidents, terrorist attacks, major
fires, epidemics); the type of industry (oil, aviation,
pharmaceutical, government organizations); and orga-
nizational culture and structure. In events involving
government/public organizations, the majority of im-
portant decisions result from bringing together key
actors. In such multi-agency environments, there can
be tensions between the various operating partners
arising from different desired outcomes and objectives,
as well as differing cultural and organizational impera-
tives.
As part of the research conducted into what con-
stituted effective crisis leadership, discussion in the
interviews highlighted the importance of leadership
attributes in dealing with the plethora of demands on
a crisis leader’s abilities. These attributes were com-
pared and contrasted in the context of both exercises
as well as real incidents. The interviewees consisted of
Gold co-ordinators as well as those who have partici-
pated as members of a Gold team in order to capture
different perspectives of effective crisis leadership.
Patterns of response were found indicating four key
areas important to leader effectiveness – Task Skills,
Interpersonal Skills, Personal Attributes and Stake-
holder Savvy (utilizing the acronym TIPS) – integrated
with professional and technical expertise, training and
exposure to incidents. The TIPS model (Figure 1) aims
to take account of the different demands on crisis
leaders and proposes an interwoven approach to meet-
ing those difficulties. This is in contrast to research on
leadership in normality. More research has been con-
ducted on leader activities and behaviour than on any
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other aspect of leadership but ‘the proliferation of
taxonomies and lack of agreement about what beha-
viors to study has made it more difficult to integrate the
research on leader behaviour’ (Yukl, 2006, p. 93). Thus,
the study of leadership seems to have had rather a
narrow focus as opposed to an integrative one.
It is argued that the extra layers of complexity that
are apparent in the multi-agency response to a major
incident need an integrative leadership approach.
Each area contains pertinent skills, behaviours and/or
attributes that facilitate and influence effectiveness,
which are defined in order to maintain consistency of
understanding. These behavioural definitions make it
easier to identify the presence or absence of the
skills and attributes for the purpose of training and
assessment.
The categorization of the groups of skills, behaviours
and attributes under the four headings could be varied
– for example, ‘accepting new reality quickly’ is placed
under Task Skills, but an alternate view fed back to the
authors was that it could also be placed under Personal
Attributes, as it could be affected by the individual, their
background and their own self-belief. This respondent –
an emergency planning officer in a large UK Constabu-
lary – commented that it was not unknown for people
to persist with a course of action even when faced with
clear evidence to the contrary. Much of the literature
on risk perception appears to suggest that risk and
irrationality are not strangers to each other (Royal
Society, 1992). He also thought that pragmatism (with a
behavioural definition referring to a focus on practical
and workable actions and outcomes) was more rele-
vant in Task Skills than in Personal Attributes; his view
was that focusing on workable solutions was directly
connected to other elements in the section on Task
Skills.
This highlights the point that although the model
identifies four areas of focus, they should not be seen as
discrete, but interwoven like a rope, each strand
essential to the whole. For example, decision making
– one of the most critical of the effectiveness criteria –
could be seen as a task that overlaps interpersonal skills
Figure 1. Interwoven leadership (TIPS) model.
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and stakeholder savvy, because decisions are not taken
independently but jointly. Willingness to take a decision,
as opposed to the intellectual capacity to analyse a
situation and come to a judgement, might be seen as
linked with the personal attribute of moral and ethical
courage. This interwoven quality goes beyond a simple
list of behaviours, skills and attributes.
All four segments are connected by three quintes-
sential factors that affect and influence the behaviours,
skills and attributes. These are the professional and
technical expertise which a leader possesses, the train-
ing they have received (including simulations and ex-
ercises), and the range of real incidents they have
attended.
Possession of the skills and attributes do not of
themselves affect leader effectiveness; it is how they
are skilfully combined and focused at the right time in
the right way that makes the difference. When these
factors are integrated and timed well, the desired
outcome is more likely to be achieved, whether that
is by balancing available resources against the needs of a
community in crisis; engaging a wide variety of stake-
holders in a crisis, each of whom has a different agenda
and set of success criteria; or co-ordinating a strategy
to return a community to a new normality. The concept
of fluid, flexible adaptable leadership is key to contri-
buting to successful outcomes (Borodzicz, 2004).
It is argued that personal and organizational culture and
values may influence the adoption and implementation of
interwoven leadership. The designation of ‘hard’ vs. ‘soft’
skills might be seen to be gender specific, with the latter
being seen by some as a more female skill set. The
emergency services are predominantly male dominated
and have traditionally been a more task-oriented culture,
placing a higher value on hard skills than on soft skills. In
informal discussion with interviewees, discomfort has
been evinced by some about incorporating soft skills
authentically, in the belief that they might be part of an
adherence to a politically correct dogma. However, this
was not a prevalent view with the more senior officers
interviewed. Increasingly, the Police Service and the Fire
and Rescue Service have recognized the need to enhance
their emotional intelligence skills, especially as the role of
emergency services has increasingly focused on interact-
ing more proactively with the communities they serve.
For an interwoven method to be embedded effec-
tively, it must be supported by the wider organizational
culture in normality and incorporated into organiza-
tional training at many levels. This may raise challenges
of ethos as well as practicality. As with all cultural shifts,
these value changes take a long time to truly embed
within an organization, and some Gold leaders may
continue to be wedded to the ‘hard skill’ approaches
that may have served them well in their careers.
Training people in an interwoven leadership approach
can certainly be carried out through focused simula-
tions and exercises. However, certain aspects may be
more easily trainable than others. Strategies for creat-
ing options may be taught – the credibility needed to
persuade others of their effectiveness involves personal
value sets, experience and confidence, inter alia. Stress-
handling strategies may be highlighted, but may not
prevent post-traumatic responses.
As one interviewee commented about multi-agency
strategic leadership, ‘One of the things that make
people good commanders is you’ve got to like it. You’ve
got to like that adrenalin . . . that buzz . . . I love taking
decisions that other people won’t take’. He also
observed, ‘People who really don’t want to do this
shouldn’t be made to. And there are some people who
really want to do this and they should be stopped’. The
implication of these comments is that some people have
what it takes and some have not, and where people sit
on the spectrum will be influenced by their personality
as well as the more trainable aspects.
One way of addressing this conundrum might be to
filter potential Gold leaders via their personal attri-
butes in the TIPS model, and then identify skills gaps
that need to be trained in the other quadrants. It is
clear that rank, experience and training alone will not
guarantee effective strategic leadership.
5. Conclusion
In carrying out this research, it has become increasingly
apparent that the web of complexity pertaining to the
unfolding events and pressures of any major incident is
mirrored by an equal complexity of successful outcome
criteria. In turn, this complexity is inexorably linked to
the personal values, experience, drivers and expertise
of the people responding to the incident. As human
beings, carrying with us a multi-faceted mix of values,
belief systems, experience, competence, knowledge
and expertise, there is an infinite kaleidoscope of
personal variables that can affect effective leadership
of a strategic multi-agency major incident team.
However, the requirement for improved understand-
ing, both practically and theoretically, of strategic
command leadership of crisis events is of more sig-
nificance than ever before. The nature of modern social
structures and systems means that the nature of threats
and the contexts in which they occur, geographically,
socially and politically, pose problems of complexity.
How we prepare strategic commanders and their
teams requires an understanding not simply of the tasks
they must perform, but of the importance of inter-
weaving task skills, interpersonal skills and personal
qualities with awareness of the multidimensional re-
quirements of stakeholders in any response. The find-
ings from this ongoing research suggest that this
approach of interwoven skills and attributes should be
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a key requirement built into the training and assessment
of leaders of strategic multi-agency crisis response and
their teams.
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